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by Merril Eisenbud*
Air and water poilution control programs sometimes result in production of solid wastes that are
diffcult to manage. The sludges from sewage treatment plants and flue gas scrubbers are two examples.
In many coastal communities, there Is no alternative to ocean dumping ofsewage sludges for the foresee-
able future. The use of sludges as soil conditioners, their conversion to fuels by pyrolysis, and other
alternatives are frequently mentioned options, but they have not been demonstrated to be practical on a
large scale. The Federal requirement that ocean dumping be terminated by 1981 presents the large
seaboard population centers with a dilemma, due to the absence of economically feasible alternative
methods of disposal.
Anothermajor solid waste problem is arising from the Federal policy that requires flue gas desulfuriza-
tion on practkally all power plants. This policy, designed to reduce sulfur oxide emissions, will require
that vast quantities ofsludge be stored. Their environmental impact is as yet not fully evaluated. Com-
mercial useofthe sulfur orsulfates produced in these processes may be possible, butitspracticability on a
large scale remains to be demonstrated.
Unlike other presentations at this symposium,
this paper will discuss solid wastes that are created
in the course of operating air or water pollution
treatment systems. The subject has already been
discussed by others on this program.
Kaufman (1) referred to EPA policy concerning
incineration ofmunicipal wastes and I think antici-
pated some of the things that I will say when he
pointed out that the Government as ofnow does not
know where the money will come from to develop
alternative methods of sludge disposal when ocean
disposal must cease in accordance with Federal dic-
tates. Hanrington (2) also discussed the sludge prob-
lem and stated that ocean dumping is not en-
vironmentally acceptable; he also reported that
pyrolysis, direct application to soil, trenching, and
composting were only in a preliminary state of de-
velopment. Yet, these are the only possible alterna-
tives tooceandisposal in many parts ofthe country.
Hugh Van Noordwyk (3) discussed the problems
ofwastes generated by water treatment processes in
the chemical industries. I will not deal with that
subject, because the problems are so specific that it
is not possible to develop a general approach to the
subject. This is also true of the treatment of liquid
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wastes from the metallurgical industries.
I will supplement what Jones (4) said about power
plant wastes, but I will not touch on the subject of
nuclear power except to say that, in my opinion,
when the decision was made to reduce the amounts
ofradioactivity that could be discharged to the gen-
eral environment by a factor of about 100, as
specified in Appendix I to Part 50 of CFR Title 10,
solid waste handling problems were created within
the plant that raised the exposure levels to which
the reactor workers were exposed. This is some-
thing that should be fully investigated. It may be
that we lost more than we gained as a consequence
of the decision to reduce the permissible releases.
My remarks will deal mainly with the special
problems of the large coastal metropolitan com-
plexes. Much ofwhat I have to say will have to do
with our experiences in New York.
A classical example of the trade-off between air
pollution wastes and solid wastes took place begin-
ning in 1951, when a law was passed in New York
City that required all apartment houses to install
incinerators to reduce the volume of solid waste.
This decision assisted the Sanitation Department by
greatly reducing the cost of collection. It was not
until 1966, about 15 years later, that the city sud-
denly realized that the apartment houses, by
installing incinerators, created 17,000 point sources
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control. The Commissioner of Air Resources in
1967 issued an order that shut down many of the
incinerators, necessitating that the Sanitation De-
partment assume an additional burden of waste
collection that they could not handle because they
did not have the manpower or the trucks. This was
one ofseveral incidents that caused the city to con-
solidate the Departments of Sanitation, Air Re-
sources, Water Supply, Water Pollution Control,
and Noise Control; all of those departments were
brought together into the city's EPA.
The Environmental Protection Administration in
New York City was formed in 1968, about three
years before the Federal EPA was organized. It was
a great time to get started. The new environmental
movement was on its way; there were new laws
being passed: people were willing to provide money
for research; there was great political support. It is
very disappointing, after ten years, to find that pol-
lution control is generally in a state of confusion.
I've heard it said by people in positions ofenviron-
mental responsibility that they know how to deal
with their enemies, but they don't know how to
handle their friends. That was our experience in
New York City. Our "enemies," if I can use that
term as an ex-city EPA Administrator in a large city
ofnearly eight million people, included the real es-
tate operators, the taxi cab owners, local industry,
and governmental agencies that operated facilities
with obsolete waste treatment systems. Somehow
we could deal with them. But it was impossible to
explain to our "friends" in the local noise abate-
ment and clean air societies, for example, why it
would take three years to control the emissions
from 17,000 apartment house incinerators, and five
years to produce a noticeable change in the noise
levels in New York City; our friends and support-
ers, the concerned citizens, could not understand
why we could not do everything that needed to be
done in a year. There was tremendous pressure on
the timetable they thought necessary, not because
they could cite technical reasons for reordering
priorities, but because they were expressing their
perceptions of what the problem was.
There are really two majorproblems that I should
talk about. One is the problem of the sewage
sludges. I guess most of you have heard the term
"Dead Sea," which is applied to an area in the New
York bight in which sludges ofall.kinds have been
dumped since 1924. The sludges are not only from
the sewage treatment plants, but also construction
debris as well as certain types of chemical wastes.
The practice of sludge dumping in the New York
Bight became a matter of toncern because the
volumes of wastes were growing, and a study was
commissioned to examine the ecological effects of
this practice. The findings of that study were pre-
sented at the New York meeting of the Water Pol-
lution Control Association in the spring of 1969. It
was a straightforward, factual report that indicated
that the sludges had accumulated over an area of
perhaps 30 or 40 km2. The biological implications of
this were to have been addressed in further studies
and it was considered likely that some changes in
sludge disposal practices would need to be made.
However, there was no indication that a crisis
existed.
Present at that conference was a political figure
who held a press conference some time after the
meeting, and he or one of his associates coined the
term "Dead Sea." The original technical presenta-
tion was not covered in the press, but the press
conference held by the public figure received agood
deal of attention. Ever since, whenever there is a
fish kill anywhere in the New York bight, or ifgar-
bage or sewage debris washes up on a nearby
shoreline, the "Dead Sea" gets into the newspa-
pers. The main point at the press conference, and in
the publicity that the matter has received ever
since, is that the sludge that had been deposited
over this very long period is spreading laterally and
is about to reach the beaches on Long Island and
the New Jersey coast. This matter has been care-
fully examined by the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, who have found that
the sludge is literally sliding down the Hudson River
canyon and is going out into deeper waters and not
spreading laterally. Somehow or other you just
can't get this point across to the press.
The catchy term, "Dead Sea," has contaminated
thinking with respect to sludge disposal on a na-
tional scale. I think that in New York there will
have to be an adjustment of the sludge disposal
methods, but we should ask ourselves what the ef-
fect is going to be when we do not deposit the undi-
gested sludges from the primary treatment system,
which result in anoxic conditions in the deeper wa-
ters during the summer months, but deposit only
sludges from the high level treatment systems that
are now under construction and are just beginning
to come on line. And what if we stop dumping
chemical waste there? And what if, instead of
dumping the sludge in the relatively small area des-
ignated for that purpose, and thus creating a pile
that is some tens ofmeters deep by now, what ifwe
spread it out by having the sludge vessels cruise
over larger areas so that the sludges are dispersed
more widely. My ecological friends tell me that the
ocean is a biological desert. Could it be that the
disposal ofthese nutrients in the properplace and in
the proper way could be beneficial to the environ-
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The sewage sludge disposal problems require a
lot of study on a case-by-case basis. I don't think
that sludges in the New York Bight are going to
behave the same as sludges would within the Cape
Cod area or down in the Delaware estuary. In each
case, the volume ofwaste should be considered and
should be characterized chemically and physically.
We may find that some sludges can be disposed of
in the oceans and some cannot, and for those that
can be disposed of in the oceans, that they can be
disposed of in certain ways and not others.
To say categorically that the New York met-
ropolitan area, which includes twenty million
people, cannot have access to the ocean for sludge
disposal without giving the local government al-
ternative methods is sheer nonsense. If, in 1977, we
do not have pyrolysis, and we do not have land
disposal methods, then we certainly are notgoing to
have them on a scale large enough by 1981 to take
care of the needs of these population centers.
One ofthe problems that was touched on but not
emphasized, with respect to the use of sludges on
farm land, is that they are often heavily contam-
inated with toxic metals and organic compounds. I
don't know what the solution to the problem is.
New York, like many cities, has combined sewers.
Everything passes through the sewage treatment
plant, the storm waters, and the sanitary sewage
(except when you have a heavy storm, and then
everything bypasses the sewage treatment plant,
which is another problem that people don't seem to
want to talk about). It's been shown that about 50%o
of the trace metals that end up in the sewage treat-
ment plant originate from the street surfaces as a
result of storm water runoff. We do not know the
origin of these trace elements. Some of it may be
fallout from industrial sources or incinerators.
Some undoubtedlyjust flakes offautomobiles. Lead
oxide from corroded storage battery terminals un-
doubtedly drops onto the road surface alittle bit at a
time and there are probably other toxic metals that
do so as well. In any case, it has been shown that
about 50% ofwhat ends up in the sewage treatment
plant actually runs offthe street surfaces. This is a
problem that is not going to be easily solved.
The question of power plant sludges is another
one that should also be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis. Dale Jones presented what I believe to be the
most optimistic presentation that could have been
made on this subject because of the relatively low
ash and sulfur content of the coal used by the par-
ticular plants described in the presentation (4).
The need for scrubbers is determined by the pres-
ent EPA emission standards. Those standards re-
quire further study and it will take another few
years to put the subject on a rational basis. There
are power plants at certain locations at which
scrubbers should be installed, but there are other
plants at other places where scrubbers are unneces-
sary, in my opinion. However, as long as we are
adhering to the present emission standards, scrub-
bers will be needed on almost all new plants.
There is a very serious question in the minds of
many people who have looked at the health effects
data as to whetherthe present sulfur oxide emission
standards are on a sustainable basis. About the time
that the SO2 standards began to be questioned, the
sulfates became a source of concern. Although the
sulfur dioxide concentrations have been reduced by
90o in New York City, the sulfate concentrations
have hardly changed. They seem to be coming from
sources other than those producing the sulfur
dioxide locally. In other words, it could be
Pittsburgh's sulfur dioxide that is being converted
to the sulfates by the time it gets to New York.
These are matters that should be betterunderstood.
Now you might say, "Well, why take a chance;
why not put the scrubbers in?" Two good reasons
are thatthey are so expensive and that they create a
solid waste problem. A scrubber for a 1000 MW
plant will cost about $100 million; it could cost as
much as $125 million, orifyou have the rightkind of
coal, as little as $75 million. The initial cost is a very
significant fraction, from 15 to 20%o ofthe total cost
of the power plant. In addition, it takes 5% of the
generated power to operate the scrubber. The vol-
ume of the wastes generated are staggering. When
you express it on an annual basis for only one plant
it doesn't seem like much, but many sites will have
five or more plants, and they will operate for several
decades. I visited a site recently where the first of
five scrubbers has been operating for a little more
than half a year. When you see the waste pond, it
doesn't look like very much, but they will have five
plants there soon which will operate for 40 years.
The volumes become enormous. The Pennsylvania
Electric Company is in the process now ofdamming
a valley to a height of 400 ft (120 m) and will in 25
years create a lake of dried sludge 400 ft (120 m)
deep and five miles (8 km) long. Do we know what
the consequences will be of runoff from deposits
such as these, not only in the next 40 years but the
next 400 years? I don't think we do. I don't know
why we have to plunge into a national policy that
dictates scrubbers for every power plant above a
certain size, which in effect means all power plants
because they are all nowadays being built over the
200 MW or so that require the scrubbers. We can
wait five years and get the facts.
This whole question took on an almost comical
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then-chairman of the American Electric Power
Company went on a crusade against the scrubber
concept. His position was that the scrubbers would
not work. The EPA stated they were feasible. Rus-
sel Train, the Environmental Protection Adminis-
trator, and Don Cook fought in the newspapers and
electronic media: they were both wrong. Don Cook
was right insofar as it went, because at that time it
was true that the scrubbers were not working prop-
erly. The National Academy of Engineering took
the position that before a scrubber design should be
accepted, it should operate for about a year, and
none had as yet operated successfully for that
length of time. But it was clear to anybody who
looked at the facts that the problems were going to
be solved. They were mainly questions ofmaterials
compatibility that were bound to be worked out,
and industry should have recognized that by waiting
long enough-a year, two years, five years-the
scrubbers would become available. But Russell
Train, in my opinion, was equally wrong in saying
that the scrubbers were then available when they
were not, and I believe it was a mistake to commit
the nation to a program which was going to require
ten billion dollars a year of capital investment and
four billion dollars a year of additional operating
costs, until more facts were available.
It is estimated that the cost of automobile emis-
sions control will be between $5 and $10 billion per
year, year in and year out. The cost for cooling
towers for power plants will also be about $5 billion
per year. One can readily see that, by piling one
upon the other, that these national policies will add
tens ofbillions ofdollars a year to consumer costs.
These requirements are being imposed, mainly in
the name of public health, at the very same time
when health and welfare expenditures in the Fed-
eral government are being curtailed. Many cost ef-
fective programs have been eliminated because this
is a period of inflation. On one hand, the govern-
ment is cutting back some tens ofmillions ofdollars
of badly-needed health services, and on the other
hand imposing tens ofbillions ofdollars in the inter-
est of pollution control systems of rather dubious
benefit.
These are questions which I think should be in-
vestigated in the year or two ahead.
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